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FROM THE DIRECTOR
In this issue of The Journal, our Editorial section examines the relationship be-
tween improvised explosive devices (IED) and the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). The evolving nature of humanitarian mine action (HMA)—particularly in ar-
eas such as Iraq and Syria—has generated debate on how to incorporate IEDs into 
the current IMAS or whether to create entirely new standards specific to IEDs. With 
thought-provoking contributions from Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining’s (GICHD) Guy Rhodes and Danish Demining Group’s (DDG) Robert Keeley, 
we welcome community feedback and contributions from the field for Issue 22.1 
(Spring 2018). 
Our Feature section focuses on stockpile management and highlights articles from 
Eric Berman and Benjamin King (Small Arms Survey); Marlène Dupouy (United Nations 
Mine Action Service); Elvan Isikozlu, Matthias Krötz, and Claire Trancart (BICC); Lee 
Moroney (Golden West Humanitarian Foundation), and Robert White (GICHD).
This issue’s Field Notes section features a tremendous selection of articles: in-
cluding discussions on HMA’s role in IEDs clearance by Craig McInally and Hans 
Risser (Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)), Sustainable Development Goals’ impact on 
HMA by Ursign Hofmann (GICHD) and Olaf Juergensen (United Nations Development 
Programme), and explosive safety awareness by Geoff Carton (CALIBRE Systems, Inc.) 
and Laura Grindstaff (Bristol Site Contractors, LCC). 
In addition, we’re pleased to feature two photographic essays in this issue. 
Photographer Ian Alderman writes about his exhibition, “Recovering the Past,” an 
innovative project that brings together two separate groups of men whose origins 
are a century apart albeit united from the First World War through present-day con-
flicts. His exhibit is currently featured at the United Nations in Geneva and as a com-
ponent of the centenary commemorations to the Battle of Passchendaele at the In 
Flanders Fields Museum, Ypres, Belgium. In addition, Vanessa Finson (NPA) and world-
renowned photographer Giovanni Diffidenti essay the government of Colombia, las 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarais de Colombia - Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and 
NPA’s joint pilot project to survey and clear anti-personnel mines and explosive rem-
nants of war (ERW).
Recognizing the importance of ordnance identification resources: Roly Evans (GICHD) 
and Eric de Brun (Ripple Design) highlight the Collaborative ORDnance Data Repository’s 
(CORD) 2018 upgrades, and Howard Rudat (MAPPS, Inc.) reports on his Landmines App 
mobile application. Additionally, this issue presents the research conducted by Andy 
Smith (University of Genoa) and William Bagley (Johns Hopkins University) on their 
Black Adder disruptors, which are designed to provide explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) operatives with open-source information on low-cost disruptors. 
For those of you who have not yet discovered James Madison University’s Scholarly 
Commons or simply “the repository,” I invite you to explore the site. The repository 
is housed within Digital Commons, the leading hosted repository software for uni-
versities, colleges, law schools, and research centers. Scholarly material and special 
collections in Digital Commons repositories are easily discoverable in Google, Google 
Scholar, and other search engines. Additionally, articles in Digital Commons reposito-
ries are indexed in the Digital Commons Network, a free discovery tool for full text 
scholarly articles used by researchers worldwide. The Journal archives are housed in 
the repository, and CISR is in the process of curating our own historical research ma-
terials to begin developing the world’s only online repository of mine action and con-
ventional weapons destruction documents. In the near future, we will be asking the 
community to contribute to this repository so this vital information is not lost. Please 
explore The Journal repository here http://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/.
KEN RUTHERFORD, DIRECTOR
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILIZATION AND RECOVERY
JAMES MADISON UNIVERSITY
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The evolving nature of humanitarian mine action—particularly in areas such as Iraq 
and Syria—has generated debate as to whether new standards on improvised explo-
sive devices (IED) should be included in current International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS), or whether such standards specific to IEDs should stand alone. We invited 
opinion on this subject, encourage conversation and debate, and welcome responses 
to be published online and/or in print in Issue 22.1.
The views expressed in articles published in The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, James Madison University, or 
the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
If readers would like to respond to editorials contained herein or submit an edi-
torial to The Journal, please contact the publications staff at: cisr-journal@jmu.edu.
by Guy Rhodes, Ph.D. [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
Improvised explosive devices (IED) are not new in mine action; they have contributed to explosive ordnance contamination in post-conflict settings since the advent of humanitarian demin-
ing almost 30 years ago.1,2 
What is new is that the systematic deployment of IEDs by armed 
groups is occurring today on a greater scale. The prevalence of use 
of these weapons by highly visible groups such as the Islamic State 
has accentuated the profile of IEDs even further. In addition, a large 
proportion of the IEDs deployed are victim-operated (VOIED) and 
contribute to a new landmine emergency characterized by a system-
atic production, standardization of designs, and the deployment of 
hundreds of thousands of locally-manufactured landmines. These 
recent developments have led to debate on how IEDs are defined in 
relation to key conventions such as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
Convention (APMBC), on the required competency levels needed to 
engage in IED disposal (IEDD) activities, and on the applicability 
of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) to provide the 
framework for mine action operations concerning IEDs.
This editorial provides a historic perspective on the extent of 
IEDD operations conducted by mine action actors, explains the 
scope and applicability of the IMAS to address all explosive ord-
nance including improvised devices, and suggests amendments to 
the IMAS to provide improved guidance to respond to IED contam-
ination in a humanitarian context.3 
A Historical Perspective
Since the late 1980s, humanitarian demining in Afghanistan 
has addressed VOIEDs as an integral part of mine action op-
erations. The HALO Trust, for instance, has cleared over 1,400 
IEDs in Afghanistan during this period. In Sri Lanka, the same 
organization has cleared almost 74,000 locally-manufactured 
landmines (over one-third of all landmines cleared by the orga-
nization in Sri Lanka), and some 1,250 more complex IEDs since 
2002. In Colombia, a further 280 locally-manufactured land-
mines were cleared by The HALO Trust between 2013 and 2016.4 
In Iraq and Syria, during the course of the last 12 months, 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group) cleared nearly 16,000 IEDs, mostly 
locally-manufactured landmines, but also sizeable numbers of 
radio-controlled, and command-detonated anti-vehicle devices 
that were abandoned (see Figures 3 and 4).5
Elsewhere in the world, improvised devices are addressed within 
mine action programs from Africa (e.g., Angola), to Europe (e.g., 
Kosovo), and to Southeast Asia (e.g., Thailand). Few major conflicts 
have occurred where improvised devices have not contributed to ex-
plosive contamination. In all these cases, the survey and clearance 
of improvised devices by mine action operators were undertaken 
within the framework of the IMAS. Image 2 presents examples of 
the wide array of IEDs addressed by mine action operators.
Colombia is a case in point. A large portion of the territory in 
Colombia is contaminated with IEDs laid by armed groups (see 
Figure 1). The great majority of the IEDs are victim-operated, 
locally-manufactured landmines (see Image 1), but other types of 
devices including timer-initiated and command-initiated IEDs are 
also present. Among further threats, there are gas cylinders used as 
projectiles, as well as improvised mortars and rockets, which often 
use explosives that have been prepared in an artisanal manner. In 
Colombia, 11,485 victims have been recorded since 1990.6 
Colombia has been guided by the IMAS in its efforts to address 
this contamination. It has used them to develop a full set of National 
Mine Action Standards (NMAS) as a framework to manage the na-
tional program of land release. 
The Objective and Scope of the IMAS
The IMAS have been developed to provide a safety, quality, and 
operational framework for mine action and to promote a com-
mon and consistent approach to the conduct of mine action oper-
ations. The IMAS provide guidance, establish principles, and—in 
some cases—define international requirements and specifications. 
They offer a frame of reference, which encourages managers of mine 
action programs and projects to achieve and demonstrate agreed 
Th
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levels of effectiveness and safety. The IMAS provide a common lan-
guage, and recommends the formats and rules for handling data, 
which enables the accurate and timely exchange of information.7 
The IMAS are not themselves standard operating procedures 
(SOP). They provide a framework for NMAS, local SOPs, rules, in-
structions, and codes of practice—documents that provide more 
details on how mine action requirements are to be achieved in a par-
ticular context.
Critically, the IMAS are framed by a humanitarian imperative 
where landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) are con-
sidered first and foremost a humanitarian concern and should 
be addressed from a humanitarian perspective (see Figure 2). In 
this regard, the framing of standards and their application to na-
tional mine action programs ref lect the fundamental humanitar-
ian principles of neutrality, impartiality, equality, and humanity 
so that mine action is focused on giving support to those who are 
most vulnerable.8 
Mine action operations are therefore not defined by weap-
on type (i.e., they include improvised devices) but by the ob-
jectives they pursue (i.e., humanitarian) and by the context 
in which they are conducted (i.e., one that permits respect for 
humanitarian principles).
As mentioned, the engagement of mine action operators in 
IEDD has, and should continue to follow, the same principles 
used for humanitarian demining operations. As such, engagement 
should continue to be based on a positive response to the following 
four questions: 
• Is the aim of the task humanitarian (as opposed to security 
or military)?
• Is the environment conducive for safe and secure operations?
• Is humanitarian access possible and the device out of play 
and cold?9 
• Does the operator have the necessary skills and equipment to 
undertake the relevant search and disposal operation?
If a threat assessment determines that an IED is still within an 
active setting and no humanitarian access is possible, then it is a mat-
ter for relevant security forces to address. Furthermore, if a device is of 
a complexity that requires a skillset or equipment that is not present, 
then additional internal competencies must be developed, equip-
ment purchased or specialist assistance requested. Such an approach 
is not restricted to IEDs but is the same for all explosive ordnance dis-
posal (EOD) operations concerning landmines and ERW.
None of this is meant to downplay the challenges associated with 
responses to IEDs. However, it is important to note that adopting a 
sound, risk-management approach for IEDs is similar to that for the 
wide spectrum of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which can range from 
simple items, such as grenades, all the way through to complex items 
such as surface-to-air missiles with hypergolic, liquid-fueled systems. 
Factors that Complicate the Debate on IEDs
Current debates on who should be doing what and where with 
regards to IEDD, particularly in the Middle East, are testament to 
Figure 1. Extent of mine contamination in Colombia (2017).
Figure courtesy of DAICMA.
Image 1. An example of an improvised landmine found in Colombia.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
What are the limitations for mine action 
operators to engage with IEDs? Is this 
different from other explosive devices?
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the existence of differing perspectives on IEDs. Military, commer-
cial, and NGO operators all have valid positions but also different 
objectives and references in their work, as well as different modali-
ties, competencies, and capabilities. 
The current debate has some strong parallels with those asso-
ciated with the early days of mine action when
• Issues of ownership of the topic of demining between NGOs, 
commercial, and military took place.
• NGO involvement in broader EOD—in addition to demin-
ing—was questioned. 
• Challenges existed in understanding requirements for a transi-
tion from a military context to a humanitarian one. 
• There was a need to establish competence requirements for 
humanitarian operations and associated training responses.
In all these past instances, the conclusions of the debates result-
ed in the increase of empowerment of mine action actors and ul-
timately the strengthening of the IMAS to more comprehensively 
frame operations that support humanitarian objectives. 
In the current debate on ownership of the IED issue, it is impor-
tant to safeguard the IMAS as the principle framework for IEDD 
work that is bounded by the objectives and contexts appropriate 
for mine action. To optimize the effectiveness of IEDD activities, 
however, collaboration between military, commercial, and NGO 
operators is important at a procedural level, including appropriate 
information exchange.
Current discussions on IEDs from both a political and operation-
al perspective are complicated by the term IED, that is not at all spe-
cific but used to describe many different devices which may have 
only one thing in common—the fact that their construction is im-
provised or that they are locally-manufactured. The many types and 
classifications of IEDs vary from simple to complex, and have been 
characterized in a lexicon published by the United Nations Mine 
Action Service (UNMAS).10 They include time-delayed IEDs, pro-
jected IEDs, and command IEDs, including suicide IEDs in vests 
and on vehicle-borne platforms.
There is also a supposition that IEDs are all complex devices, 
whereas, in reality, while they can present considerable additional 
technical challenges during search and disposal operations, IEDs 
can also be relatively simple and standardized in design. The 
vast majority of IEDs addressed to date in Iraq and Syria exist as 
locally manufactured landmines. They have been produced on a 
massive scale by the Islamic State and are more readily detected and 
disposed of than many industrially-manufactured landmines that 
may, for instance, have a low metal content.
The rising impact of IED attacks in public places has been ex-
tensively documented by Action On Armed Violence (AOAV).11 
Armed groups play an active and influential role in wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, and pose serious 
threats to national security in Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Pakistan. Such IED attacks 
Figure 2. A schematic to illustrate the objective and scope of the IMAS. The IMAS provide a framework to guide mine action in pursuit of its  
humanitarian objectives and in accordance with humanitarian principles. 
Figure courtesy of GICHD.
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Mine action operators have always carried out risk assessments 
ahead of operations, however, this process has largely been implic-
it in SOPs or has relied on the experience from field staff. Given the 
complexity of some of the devices found in environments such as 
in Iraq and Syria, there is a real need to carry out more explicit risk 
assessments.15 This is reinforced by asymmetry of many conflicts, 
where large-scale battles cease but armed actors continue to exert 
influence and make use of explosives to disrupt and destabilize se-
curity. There is a requirement to systematize the evaluation of such 
contexts to ensure that mine action remains focused on humani-
tarian objectives and aims to uphold humanitarian principles. A 
more formalized guidance will benefit all mine action operations— 
whether in settings that exhibit IED contamination or otherwise.
The IMAS place a high priority on the issue of efficiency and 
the importance of targeting mine action resources appropriately. 
In rural environments, non-technical survey helps target clearance 
assets at suspected (SHA) or confirmed hazardous areas (CHA) 
based on evidence. In addition, specific training to improve eval-
uation skills and the ability of survey teams to accurately define 
such areas is elaborated in the IMAS. Similar guidance that targets 
the urban environment is lacking—including methodology for ur-
ban assessments, such as how to assess urban structures, take into 
account rubble (including rubble contaminated by explosive ord-
nance), and deal with threats of IEDs hidden in residential, occu-
pational, and community premises. 
Strengthening of the IMAS 
The IMAS have been designed as evolving standards that are con-
stantly reviewed and updated to ensure that they stay relevant and 
applicable to the changing nature of settings where mine action ac-
tivities are conducted. 
The IMAS currently fall short in the necessary guidance to ad-
dress tasks concerning IEDs. As a consequence, there is mounting 
consensus from the IMAS Review Board members to suggest that 
in light of the current political debates and operational demands 
there is a need to:
raise the profile of IEDs as an issue of con-
cern, but most incidents relate to car bombs 
and suicide attacks that fall well outside the 
parameters of mine action and the IMAS. 
Such devices and circumstances should be 
dealt with in separate guides and standards 
for use by security forces.
Incidents involving IEDs should be un-
packed to separate IED terror attacks using 
command detonation from those initiated 
by victims. IED operations in response to 
terror attacks fall within the purview of se-
curity forces. This is a different context than 
that where civilians are threatened from en-
during contamination from IEDs and that 
can be addressed during humanitarian op-
erations. 
Applicability of the IMAS to Address 
IEDs Today
The IMAS as they stand already cover ex-
plosive ordnance of an improvised nature. 
IEDs are included in the current nomencla-
ture found in the IMAS and there are at least 
nine specific references to IEDs within the 
existing chapters. These references do not limit the scope of cover-
age of the IMAS to a certain group of IEDs, such as pressure-plate 
IEDs, but rather are all-encompassing.12 
Key terms used by the mine action sector, such as explosive ord-
nance, landmines (in particular anti-personnel landmines), ERW 
and its components, such as UXO and abandoned explosive ord-
nance (AXO), include improvised devices within the context of the 
IMAS glossary.13,14 
Explicit and implicit references to IEDs in the IMAS have al-
lowed programs to frame operations that concern improvised 
devices within the existing standards. National programs in 
Afghanistan, Angola, Sri Lanka, and particularly Colombia are 
testament to this. 
Notwithstanding the framework that the IMAS provide for IEDD 
activities, there is a significant shortfall in the explicit guidance on 
IEDs in the IMAS. These deficiencies in the standards have become 
increasingly apparent as international attention focuses on countries 
such as Iraq and Syria, where the explosive contamination, partic-
ularly in areas formally under the control of the Islamic State, in-
cludes unexploded and abandoned IEDs, in urban as well as rural 
settings. In such theaters, operators have to review skill sets of their 
field staff, and national authorities are under pressure to scrutinize 
accreditation procedures of organizations under their responsibility. 
Furthermore, donors consider value for money from a wide variety 
of proposals and look to issue grants and contracts with appropriate 
reference to international norms. All such actors look to the IMAS 
for guidance on IEDD, currently with only limited success.
A focus on the additional guidance necessary in current contexts, 
including IEDs in the urban environment, is overdue. IEDs in these 
contexts increase the need for the IMAS to expand on: 
• Sound risk assessment processes. 
• Rapid and accurate surveys. 
• Safe and efficient processes for removal and/or destruction of 
explosive ordnance. 
• Reaffirmation of humanitarian, rather than military, 
objectives. 
Image 2. A selection of photos of improvised devices taken from archives of humanitarian 
operators.
Image courtesy of The HALO Trust.
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• State more clearly and up front in the IMAS the applicability 
of the IMAS concerning IEDs. Hence an amendment is need-
ed to IMAS 01.10, Guide for the application of International 
Mine Action (IMAS).
• Clarify selected terminology (IMAS 04.10, Glossary of mine 
action terms, definitions and abbreviations) due to inconsis-
tencies with other key sources of terminology (e.g., the major 
disarmament/arms control conventions, and the UNMAS 
IED Lexicon).
• Add elements of technical guidance that will assist national 
authorities and operators to ensure the safety and effective-
ness of work. 
Other areas being considered and supported by GICHD 
include:
• A greater emphasis on risk assessments and risk management 
frameworks.
• A strengthening of competency levels, equipment, and train-
ing requirements. 
• Further guidance within the IMAS or Technical Notes on 
Mine Action (TNMA) addressing mine action in an urban 
environment, especially survey and information manage-
ment considerations. 
It is important to recall, however, that the IMAS remain a glob-
al framework and should not dwell on specific and local contexts. 
There is ample opportunity in the development of NMAS to adapt 
international standards concerning IEDs to national contexts.
Summary
The IMAS have an established architecture developed over two 
decades of work that has legitimacy and standing. They have been 
developed for the mine action sector for operations performed in 
pursuit of humanitarian objectives and in accordance with hu-
manitarian principles, and represent the set of standards used to 
promote and maintain quality during the implementation of mine 
action activities.
Mine action operations are not defined by weapon type but by 
the objectives they pursue and the context in which they take place. 
The IMAS therefore provide the overall framework to address all 
explosive ordnance, including IEDs within the boundaries of hu-
manitarian action. 
The suitability of a mine action operator to engage at a par-
ticular location or with a specific explosive device is based, first, 
on the operator being clear on the humanitarian objective of 
the undertaking, and on it having access to humanitarian space 
and, second, on the operator possessing staff with necessary 
skills and equipment to perform the task. 
Although hundreds of thousands of IEDs, including locally-
manufactured landmines, have been cleared during mine action 
operations within the framework of the IMAS, the standards are in 
need of being strengthened in a number of areas. These include risk 
management, competency levels, training and equipment require-
ments, and amendments to IMAS 01.10 and IMAS 04.10 to clarify 
their application to improvised devices and to address inconsisten-
cies in the glossary of definitions. Further technical guidance in-
cluding operations in an urban environment should be included in 
the IMAS or a supporting TNMA.
Matters relating to IEDD operations in military and security 
contexts should be elaborated outside the IMAS—whether 
procedures to counter IED attacks particularly concerning vehicle- 
or person-borne IEDs, or aspects of forensics or intelligence that 
could be used to bring perpetrators to justice. All of these are 
incompatible with humanitarian action and principles and do not 
have space in the scope and remit of the IMAS.
There is a priority, however, to protect the integrity of the IMAS 
to address all relevant explosive ordnance, including IEDs, as the 
primary framework to manage operations that are humanitarian in 
nature.16 
See endnotes page 66
Mine action operations are not defined by 
weapon type, but by the objectives they pursue 
and the context in which they take place.
Figure 3. Improvised devices cleared in Iraq by MAG between July 2016 
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command 
Operated). 
Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.
Figure 4. Improvised devices cleared in Syria by MAG between July 2016 
and August 2017 (IMP – Improvised; RC – Radio Controlled; CO – Command 
Operated).
Figure courtesy of MAG and GICHD.
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There is an ongoing debate about the need for standards for improvised explosive device (IED) activities. The emer-gence of civilian IED response follows the development 
of humanitarian mine action (HMA) in many ways. In particular, 
the problems of defining contractual targets and norms were prob-
lematic in the early days of HMA, when, as for the IED response 
today, money has started to change hands for services rendered. 
It is the premise of this editorial that the need for humanitarian 
IED (HIED) response standards derives from the contractual na-
ture of the relationship between the client and the service provider. 
Therefore, if they are to be of use, any new IED response standards 
for use in the humanitarian sector must not simply rehash existing 
technical military-oriented counter-IED (C-IED) procedures but 
must address the problems caused by the introduction of a civilian 
business model, and also take account of their relationship with 
the humanitarian sphere.
Such tasks, when conducted by security forces, are managed 
using what amounts to an honor system. Teams carry out work 
to the best of their ability, with supervision and quality manage-
ment provided through the chain of command. There are no re-
quirements for extra, contractual stipulations as work processes 
are defined by internal norms such as organizational standard 
operating procedures (SOP). 
However, when financial pressures are applied to services pro-
vided under contract, standard economic theory suggests that there 
is an added, economic incentive to increase output at the expense 
of quality. This was widely observed in the early days of HMA and 
a series of process controls evolved to address this issue. Thus, the 
question remains: what problems are likely to be faced in the qual-
ity management of civilian IED response, and what processes can 
be used to address these problems?
Definitions and Assumptions 
Firstly, it is important to take a view on the debate regarding 
the definition of IED and its relationship to other terms, namely 
(improvised) landmine and booby trap. For the purposes of this 
editorial, it is held that these terms overlap and describe different 
attributes of any particular device. The term IED refers solely to the 
way an explosive device is made, and a mine is a weapon activated 
by the victim. Thus, a device that is manufactured in an improvised 
manner and set up to be activated by the victim is both an IED and 
a mine. Similarly, given that a booby trap functions when the victim 
carries out an apparently harmless act, there is considerable room 
for overlap between the three terms. 
Secondly, there is increasing recognition in the HMA sector that 
the status of an IED is particularly relevant in determining the 
technical response. The sector is discussing the use of terms like 
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Improvised Explosive Device 
(HIED) Response Activities
by Robert Keeley, Ph.D. [ Danish Demining Group ]
active and legacy to describe whether or not an IED is in play or is, 
in effect, an explosive remnant of war (ERW). This article uses the 
following definitions:
Active device. The term active device is used to describe any IED 
that is still under the effective control of the individual or group 
that deployed them, or where the local populations and relevant 
authorities in those locations do not wish to see them removed.
Legacy device. The term legacy device is used to describe any 
IED that is no longer under the effective control of the individual or 
group that deployed them, and where the local populations and rel-
evant authorities in those locations wish to see them removed. Any 
device that does not meet the definitions of a legacy device should 
be considered an active device. 
Thirdly, there needs to be a common understanding of what IED 
response means. C-IED is commonly held to be an overarching 
range of activities, including actions to:
• Attack the network (of insurgents using IEDs).
• Reduce casualties.
• Defeat the device.
• Train the capacity.
It is the assumption of this editorial that HIED response will not 
attack the network but can be involved in any (or all) of the other 
elements of C-IED. 
Fourthly, it is also the assumption of this editorial that HIED is 
as much a subset of the HMA sector as it is a subset of C-IED. Thus, 
this can be visualized as a Venn diagram (see Figure 1).
Finally, these notes are written to help understand how civilian 
organizations (both commercial and NGO) can contribute to HIED 
activities. One issue that has become increasingly clear in recent 
months is the difference between working in a humanitarian or a se-
curity environment (as illustrated in Figure 1). This is often linked in 
discussions about whether or not the IED is an active or legacy de-
vice (as described previously). While there is a link between these 
questions, the terms should not be used interchangeably. Rather it is 
suggested that the following distinctions should be drawn:
Legacy IED. Only humanitarian considerations are relevant.
Active IED. Both HIED and C-IED approaches are relevant, de-
pending on the requirement.
These notes are primarily intended to consider HIED under condi-
tions where the IED is no longer considered active or in play. There is a 
brief discussion at the end of this editorial about what difference an ac-
tive scenario might make to contractual standards for HIED activities.
Challenges: How Much Search is Enough?
All HIED activities—and particularly search activities—
represent a need to strike a reasonable balance between 
effectiveness and efficiency. One of the main differences between 
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IEDs and other explosive weapons is that IEDs are (almost) always 
disguised. As a result, significant effort must be spent to locate the 
device before disposal action can be taken. Given the range of com-
plexity (particularly in terms of disguise) of many modern IEDs, to 
always be fully effective one might have to dismantle all buildings 
brick by brick to be 100 percent certain that the building does not 
contain IEDs. This is akin to destroying the village in order to save 
it and is, in effect, doing the enemy’s job for them. Such a compre-
hensive approach to search is also very inefficient as dismantling of 
a building will take a search team a very long time.
On the other hand, there is potentially a perverse incentive 
for civilian HIED operators to maximize efficiency (particularly 
if they are paid by the number of tasks completed or the square 
meterage covered) by minimizing the effort (or effectiveness) of 
search activities. Without clear, contractual requirements and 
norms in place, there is a risk of ‘rush to the bottom’ quality in 
civilian HIED work. A similar problem was resolved in the early 
days of HMA through the development of clearance norms, re-
sulting in, for example, the need to search 100 percent of a desig-
nated area to a specific depth in area clearance, i.e., either mine 
clearance or battle area clearance (BAC). Quality assurance (QA) 
and quality control (QC) procedures were developed to help en-
sure and check that clearance was carried out to the required ex-
tent. Similar requirements can be applied to area clearance of 
victim activated IEDs (VOIED) where these have been employed 
as improvised mines. However, as described previously, this is 
problematic in terms of other search tasks, particularly building 
tasks. It begs the question: how much search is enough? 
Is it a new device, or one that was missed? Another problem en-
countered in the early days of HMA was when a mine was subse-
quently found in an area declared as clear. This often resulted in 
claims of re-mining even when there was no ongoing conflict. This 
is likely to be a more significant problem in civilian HIED activities 
given the very real risk of continued IED use by stay-behind person-
nel or renewed activity by insurgents. However, as in HMA, claims 
of re-mining may also be a convenient excuse for poor HIED activi-
ties. The use of formal handover processes and the retention of li-
ability for a task site helped reduce claims of re-mining in HMA. 
Identifying the difference between active and legacy tasks in what 
is emerging as the humanitarian IED sector has been an early step 
to help ameliorate this problem, but there is still a need to consider 
how to address any stay-behind IED activities in this regard.
What should be expected of HIED? A third problem addressed 
in the development of the HMA sector was the need to clarify the 
outputs (and hence outcomes) of various HMA activities. The de-
velopment of the five HMA pillars (see Figure 2) was an early but 
perhaps flawed attempt to do this.1 It was useful because it helped 
explain that mine action was greater than mine clearance. It was 
flawed because it mixed field operations with the advocacy ele-
ments of mine action, and specifically because it did not recognize 
the key role played by mobile explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) 
teams in dealing with spot tasks involving unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). 
Subsequent work identified the three main field products of 
the HMA sector as area clearance (minefield or BAC), mobile 
EOD spot tasks, and mine risk education (MRE).2 This clarifica-
tion in turn helps identify the incommensurate values of these 
actions: area clearance is something that produces cleared land 
and does not necessarily reduce casualties, and EOD spot tasks 
and MRE, which act to reduce casualties (either by removing haz-
ards or modifying behavior) but do not act to clear areas of land. 
These clarifications assist in the establishment of a Theory of 
Change (ToC) for HMA by setting out the different outputs and 
outcomes for the main HMA products.
Scoping HIED tasks
Defining core HIED response pillars. The core humanitarian 
HIED pillars can be defined as follows:
1. Search involves all actions to locate, access, and confirm sus-
pect IED, or to establish the absence of such devices.3
2. IED Disposal (IEDD) includes all actions required to make 
an IED permanently ineffective.4
3. IED risk education (IED RE) is an educational process in-
tended to reduce casualties from IEDs through the modifica-
tion of behavior.5
A Theory of Change for HIED
A similar treatment needs to be done to establish the metrics of 
HIED activities. Indeed, this can be considered the prime require-
ment to establish a quality management regime for HIED. A ToC for 
typical HIED activities can be summarized as in Figure 3. Danish 
Demining Group (DDG) is currently doing more work on the ToC 
for HIED, including a linkage with the Sustainable Development 
C-IEDHMA
1 7
2
3
8
9
4
5
6
Mitigate human impact Attack the network
Key: Typical examples of 
activities within HMA and C-IED
1.    Mine/area clearance
2.    Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
3.    Mine Risk Education (MRE)
4.    Search
5.    IED Disposal (IEDD)
6.    IED Risk Education (IED RE)
7.    Force protection
8.    Forensics
9.    Intelligence gathering
Figure 1. Interrelationship between HMA and C-IED. The rugby-ball-shaped area in the center represents the HIED response subsector. Note that 
humanitarian responses tend to focus on mitigating impact, whereas C-IED activities tend to focus on attacking the network. A list of examples of 
typical activities in both sectors, including in the HIED subsector, are shown in the key. These activities are discussed in more detail in the text.
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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Figure 2. The HMA Pillars.1
• CLEARANCE. Removing and destroying landmines and explosive remnants of war, and marking or fencing off areas contami-
nated with them
• EDUCATION. Risk education helps people understand the risks they face, identify mines and explosive remnants of war, and 
learn how to stay out of harm’s way
• VICTIM ASSISTANCE. Medical assistance and rehabilitation services to victims, including job-skills training and employment 
opportunities
• ADVOCACY. Advocating for a world free from the threat of landmines and encouraging countries to participate in interna-
tional treaties and conventions
• STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION. Helping countries destroy their stockpiles of mines as required by international agreements
Goals (SDG), and it is hoped that this more detailed work can be 
shared soon.
Note again the incommensurate values in these different tasks. 
Search tasks, like mine clearance or BAC, do not necessarily find 
IEDs, thus they cannot be considered as primarily resulting in a re-
duction of casualties. They do however result in the release of safe 
land. Similarly, IEDD and IED RE do not result in cleared land but 
can be expected to reduce casualties either by the removal of haz-
ards or by the modification of behavior (again, this is akin to con-
ventional EOD spot tasks and MRE in the HMA sphere).
Also note that Figure 3 does not consider area clearance of 
VOIED fields. As has been made clear elsewhere, VOIED employed 
as improvised mines are covered adequately by existing HMA defi-
nitions and approaches, providing the appropriate equipment and 
detailed, render-safe procedures are in place. 
Possible Contracting Modalities and Deliverables for 
HIED Activities
There are two contracting models available to address the 
problems discussed in this editorial. Firstly, there is the output-
based model, as commonly used in commercial mine clearance. 
This model normally uses a firm, fixed-price bidding process to 
maximize efficiency. In an output-based model, service provid-
ers would be paid for the area of land cleared, normally through a 
pre-defined scope of works (including specifications of the prod-
uct quality) as included in the contract. This model is attractive 
for clients requiring a specific area cleared to a defined depth, but 
it lacks f lexibility in case of any new requirements identified dur-
ing the course of the project. It is also unsuitable for spot tasks. 
Output-based models are also particularly suitable for training 
or RE projects where the key deliverable is the number of train-
ing recipients. The main risk with output-based contracting for 
area clearance is ensuring effectiveness, i.e., that the quality of 
the output meets the desired specification, but this can be ad-
dressed with appropriate quality management processes.
The second potential contracting model for HIED activities is 
the service-contract model. In a service contract, the suppliers 
would be contracted to provide a capacity capable of carrying out 
pre-defined types of tasks for a specified period of time. Acceptable 
response times can be included in the specification. Service con-
tracts are suited to tasks that are not easily measurable in terms 
of units of output, and therefore lend themselves to more complex 
spot tasks such as a building search (or IEDD). Service contracts 
are flexible as it allows the client to deploy the teams when and 
where desired. Such contracts thus lend themselves to maximizing 
effectiveness, but there is a risk of poor efficiency if the client does 
not contract for the appropriate number of teams or if the teams are 
slow at responding. This can be managed through use of response 
time analysis and a contracting model that allows for penalizing of 
poor service provision.6 The application of these two contracting 
models in HIED is summarized in Figure 4.
It should be noted that it is possible to use service contracts for 
area work such as area or route searches, and this may be appro-
priate where a number of small or otherwise unpredictable search 
tasks are expected. However, there is an increased risk in lower con-
tractual efficiency as a result. It may even be appropriate to use both 
models, where large output-based search contracts allow for econo-
mies of scale, and service-contract models are used to allow for un-
planned or otherwise complex tasks. 
As has been discussed previously, one of the key issues in HIED 
search is that, unlike for mine clearance or BAC, it is not possible 
to define the scope of a building-search task in terms of 100 per-
cent search to a defined depth. A reputable search team command-
er will investigate any ground sign until they are sure that there 
Figure 3. Summary Theory of Change of HIED activities, key outputs, and outcomes.
Ser HIED activity Area or 
spot
Output Outcome Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 Area (rummage) 
search for cache/
hides
Area M2 searched 
Cache found
Increased productive use of 
safe land
Note: clearance of VOIED fields as for 
HMA minefields
2 Route search Area Linear m/km 
searched
Increased productive use of 
safe route
3 Building search Spot Building 
searched
Safe access to building
4 IED  
disposal (IEDD)
Spot IED destroyed • Removal of hazard
• Reduction of casualties
Includes vehicle search
5 IED risk education 
(IED RE)
n/a RE given • Modification of behavior
• Reduction of casualties
As for MRE but taking account of  ‘do no 
harm’ and improvised nature of devices
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are no IEDs present, but the risk in a civilian scenario is where an 
amoral service provider decides to maximize profit through either 
expediting search quickly or by skimping on the training or other 
costs of the teams. Thus, in any circumstance where the only con-
tracting proviso is unit cost, reputable search teams will tend to 
lose out to providers willing to provide a cheaper but potentially 
ineffective service. 
Quality Management Techniques Available for HIED
The establishment of a quality management (QM) framework for 
HIED activities becomes easier now that the definitions of the ac-
tivities are established, their inter-relationships are clear, and a ToC 
for each activity is in place. Many of the QM techniques as set out 
in Figure 5 may be familiar from HMA. Others may be additionally 
appropriate for HIED actions, particularly for search. Figure 5 rep-
resents a summary of the various QM techniques. More work needs 
to be done to adapt them to HIED in detail.
Quality in HIED Contract Design
As set out previously, the handover process developed in HMA 
for area clearance is applicable to HIED area and route search. 
However, contracts for building search may need to account for 
finds after handover. This could involve the use of follow-up stud-
ies in the event of missed items to identify whether the search team 
could have been expected to find the item if conducting drills prop-
erly. The assumption of legacy items will be key in this regard. It 
may also be useful for such contracts to be able to cancel funding in 
cases of poor technical performance. The details of contract design 
will vary greatly with each funder, but it may make sense to include 
a periodic progress and quality review for the purposes of continu-
ing or cancelling contracts. One other point: it is clear that simply 
going for the lowest price in the absence of contractual benchmarks 
will not result in a HIED service that is fit for purpose.
Bonds, Indemnities, and Compensation
To indemnify is to compensate for loss or damage; to provide 
security for financial reimbursement to an individual in case of a 
specified loss incurred by the person.7
Given that a specific problem is how to ensure that HIED service 
providers guarantee that enough effort is spent on a search, then it 
might be appropriate to require some form of indemnity as com-
pensation in the event that an item is missed and then either subse-
quently found or inadvertently detonated. This could be in the form 
of a bid bond or through retaining part of the payments until after 
the contract is completed. The retention of part of the payment to 
ensure quality is a common practice in the construction sector and 
may be appropriate in HIED, particularly for search tasks.
Are the Problems Addressed?
Effectiveness, efficiency, and defining the scope of works. This 
editorial helps to highlight the tension between effectiveness and ef-
ficiency in HIED activities, particularly during search actions. The 
clarification of the outputs from different activities will help man-
age expectations. Whereas the products of area and route search, 
and IEDD itself, can be treated much like their HMA equivalents 
for the purposes of contracting, these discussions also highlight 
that building-search tasks are going to be the most problematic 
from a contractual point of view. Use of a service-contract model in 
addition to a strong accreditation and quality management frame-
work may be the best approach for funding a building-search capac-
ity, with an added use of bonds or indemnities against items being 
found after a search is complete. Price must not be the only criteria 
for awarding HIED contracts or grants.
Re-mining or missed items. In IED response actions against 
legacy items, it would appear theoretically clear that there should 
be no instances of re-mining. Providing an appropriate risk as-
sessment is completed by the contracting or tasking agency, work 
should only be done in areas where there is limited risk of new, ac-
tive items being used. However, it is realistic to recognize that a re-
turn of insurgent activity is likely in many areas where there has not 
been some sort of comprehensive peace settlement. Thus, the use of 
robust handover procedures will help mitigate the liability of the 
service provider, who would not be liable for devices found or ac-
tivated after the handover process, but strong QM procedures will 
help ensure that the task site is not accepted unless there is sufficient 
confidence that the work has been fit for purpose.
Implications for work on active tasks. One of the assumptions 
made at the beginning of this editorial was that HIED work would 
tend to focus on legacy tasks. However, this may not always be the 
case every time civilian organizations are contracted for IED re-
sponse work. Tasks may involve the full range of IED initiation 
mechanisms, and there is also a much greater risk of re-mining. 
The latter can be dealt with contractually through a rigorous appli-
cation of the handover process, and through the maintenance of a 
security cordon normally in place during C-IED operations to pre-
vent re-entry by insurgents in the period between IED response ac-
tivities and handover. The increased complexity of active devices 
(in terms of their means of initiation) can similarly be addressed 
by ensuring that the contracting process pays sufficient attention 
to the need for training, equipment, and procedures for time- and 
Ser HIED activity Output Contracting 
model
Key deliverables Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
1 Area (rummage) search for 
cache/hides
M2 searched 
Cache found
Output based/
service contract
m2/km2
2 Route search Linear m/km 
searched
Output based/
service contract
Linear m/km
3 Building search Building 
searched
Service contract Availability of search team 
in working days/years
Monitored by response 
time analysis
4 IED disposal (IEDD) IED destroyed Service contract Availability of search team 
in working days/years
Monitored by response 
time analysis
5 IED risk education (IED RE) RE given Output based Number of recipients
Figure 4. Possible contracting deliverables for HIED activities.
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command-initiated devices used by insurgents in the country in 
question at the time of the contract, implying a far more rigorous 
accreditation process. 
It should be clear that there is no contractual impediment for 
non-profit organizations undertaking active tasks: the questions of 
security and impartiality are questions for each organization to de-
termine themselves, and should not be assumed or imposed exter-
nally. For DDG, the question of active and legacy is a key part of a 
rigorous risk management process. Other organizations, including 
commercial organizations, may have a different approach depend-
ing on their appetite for risk. They may also be willing to take on 
other C-IED and force protection tasks that fall outside this edito-
rial definition of HIED response.
Product definition. The third problem highlighted previously 
was the need to understand what can be expected of HIED activi-
ties. This is a question of product definition and this editorial has 
set out how the lessons learned from HMA can be used to formu-
late both a set of HIED pillars and also the outlines for a ToC for all 
three of these main HIED components. It is important to note that 
while conversations often focus on IEDD, the need to first locate 
the device (through search) is a significant product in its own right. 
Also, one must recognize that IED RE for local populations must 
account for both the similarities and differences between land-
mines, UXO, and IEDs.
Recommendations
There is a widespread demand for HIED standards. Firstly, it is 
recommended that any such standards need to focus on the con-
tractual parameters, recognizing that the significant development 
in HIED is the increased funding of civilian organizations to carry 
out such work. Secondly, in order to develop contractual standards, 
it should be recognized that the first step is to define the main activ-
ities carried out under HIED, and that in the humanitarian sphere 
these include search and RE as well as IEDD. Thirdly, it is important 
to adopt the appropriate contractual model to reflect the nature of 
the activity. Fourthly, a range of quality management tools can be 
adapted for use in HIED contracts once this process of product defi-
nition is in place. 
This editorial does not pretend to address the complete require-
ment for HIED standards: much more work is needed to develop 
such standards in detail. However, it is hoped that it has set out the 
main areas of focus that will be needed if it is to be possible to ef-
fectively civilianize some IED response activities in the humani-
tarian sphere. 
See endnotes page 66
Ser QM technique Description Time frame Remarks
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
1 Accreditation Including assessment of training, equipment, key 
personnel qualifications and SOP
Pre-operations
2 Quality 
Assurance (QA)
Observation: adherence with scope of works 
(SOW) and approved SOP
During operations SOW = scope of works
3 Handover 
procedures
Formal acceptance of completed task by customer 
from clearance agency (for route or area search)
Immediately at end of 
task
Establish point in time for mitigation of 
liability
4 Quality Control 
(QC)
Post clearance sampling and checks Post-operation
5 Performance 
analysis
Including: 
• Number of items found after search
• Damage caused during disposal
Post-operation See discussion below
6 Accident 
investigations
Casualties caused by missed items or other poor 
procedures
As necessary Could be for injuries involving C-IED personnel 
or for civilians
7 Response time 
analysis
Comparison of performance compared to 
estimated norms, looking at number of tasks done 
and any backlog of tasks
Periodically Measurement of efficiency
8 KAP studies Measuring knowledge of people receiving IED RE Baseline and endline 
studies
9 Reduction in 
casualties
Comparison of casualty numbers over time Time-series study to 
compare effect of 
intervention over time
Can also compare with figures in area where 
program was not working (cross-sectional 
analysis)
Figure 5. Range of QM techniques available for HIED.
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PROMOTING SECURE STOCKPILES AND 
COUNTERING DIVERSION
by Eric G. Berman and Benjamin King [ Small Arms Survey ]
Poor management of government stockpiles of small arms and ammunition poses significant safety and security con-cerns—both for the country in question and often for its 
neighbors. Challenges to safety are readily apparent by the frequent 
occurrence and consequences of unplanned explosions at muni-
tions sites (UEMS). Security shortcomings include oversight limita-
tions that facilitate corrupt practices and seizures of state materiel 
by armed groups that undercut a state’s legitimate use of force, and 
undermine good governance and the rule of law.
The Small Arms Survey (hereafter referred to as the Survey) 
actively contributes to efforts to promote physical security and 
stockpile management (PSSM) and life-cycle management of 
ammunition (LCMA), and works with—and benefits from—
practitioners and policy makers focusing on these agendas.1 The 
development of the Survey’s UEMS-related research, for example, 
was made possible in large part by the active engagement of the 
Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) 
and the financial support of the Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM/WRA).2 The Survey also works closely with 
the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD) in support of the Swiss Safe and Secure Management 
of Ammunition (SSMA) Initiative and other joint efforts, such as 
the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affair’s (UNODA's) 
SaferGuard program to promote the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATG). Survey databases and tools are 
frequently used to develop national capacities and to raise 
awareness among decision makers on the importance of adequately 
funding and meaningfully improving PSSM and LCMA practices. 
Update on Existing Tools and Reference Materials
Long-term readers of The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction will remember the Survey’s efforts to develop its UEMS 
Database.3 Early data collection efforts resulted in the identifica-
tion of over 400 UEMS incidents in more than 90 countries between 
1979 and 2011. The UEMS Database has since evolved, both in terms 
of the number of incidents entered and the additional data record-
ed for specific events. As of August 2017, the number of UEMS in-
cidents since 1979 totaled 567. UEMS have occurred in (at least) 
101 countries on every continent except Antarctica (see Figure 1). 
The database includes fields on causation, casualties suffered, type 
of site, ownership, tonnage lost, and some 50 other criteria. This 
data provides a basis for analysis to allow for greater insight into 
the human, financial, and political costs associated with improper 
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Figure 1. Countries with UEMS: January 1979 to August 2017. 
Courtesy of Small Arms Survey.
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ammunition management as well as an evidence base to 
support good practice. 
The UEMS Database has led to the development of 
two concrete tools aimed at understanding and mitigat-
ing the safety and security risks that improperly man-
aged ammunition stockpiles pose: the UEMS Handbook 
and the UEMS Incident Reporting Template (IRT). The 
Survey’s 2014 UEMS Handbook, which covers the peri-
od 1979–2013, provides a comprehensive overview of 
UEMS. Each incident recorded in the UEMS Database 
at the time is listed by country within regions, as well as 
chronologically for ease of reference. The publication also 
includes the Survey’s popular PSSM Best Practice Cards 
(see Figure 2), which also exist as playing cards.4 Other 
features of the handbook include an analysis of these in-
cidents’ scale and scope (e.g., their causes, numbers, and 
effects), an annotated bibliography and review of various guidelines, 
studies, and tools, and short overviews of some three dozen actors 
(e.g., the U.N. bodies and agencies, regional organizations, non- 
governmental organizations, and private companies) working to re-
duce the threat poorly-managed munitions sites and surplus am-
munition pose to people’s safety and security. The handbook also 
includes the UEMS IRT.
Despite important progress made in developing and strength-
ening the database, data-collection challenges remain. To a large 
extent, the UEMS database depends on open-source informa-
tion, such as media reports or other public documents. Although 
a useful source of information, such documents may be limited 
in terms of the amount of detail provided regarding the circum-
stances of the UEMS incident. Official investigative reports are 
often confidential due to potential legal liability concerns or to 
save face in light of improper ammunition management prac-
tices. Consequently, there is a dearth of information in open 
source reports, resulting in a paucity of detail surrounding cer-
tain UEMS incidents. 
In an effort to address the data gaps related to UEMS, and to pro-
vide states with a framework for investigating and reporting on in-
cidents, the Survey created the UEMS IRT (see Figure 3). This tool 
exists in Arabic, Bosnian-Croatian-Montenegrin-Serbian (BCMS), 
English, French, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, and Swahili. The 
template addresses six UEMS-related questions:
• When did the UEMS incident occur?
• Where did the UEMS incident occur?
• Who owns the site and the contents 
on it?
• Why did the UEMS incident occur?
• What happened as a result of the 
explosion?
• How did the state and the interna-
tional community respond?
The Survey continuously updates the 
UEMS Database and developed the UEMS 
IRT to assist in this process.5 The Survey 
knows that this tool is in considerable de-
mand from the more than 10,000 times it has 
been downloaded from the Survey’s website.6 
A challenge facing the Survey is how to en-
sure that this tool is fully exploited to devel-
op national capacities and good practice. It 
would also be useful to more fully generate, 
collate, and verify crucial information about 
UEMS, which can then better inform on the risks associated with 
ammunition management.
Even with existing challenges and limitations, the UEMS 
Database allows for important policy-relevant and agenda-setting 
analyses. For instance, almost one in six incidents involve muni-
tions stockpiles owned or managed by private companies or non-
state armed groups. This raises important questions about the 
adequacy of government oversight regarding the former, and 
about the utility of donor support to perhaps enhance some sites 
of the latter. Casualties suffered from explosions vary consider-
ably, suggesting that while it is not possible to completely stop 
incidents from happening, the implementation of good safety prac-
tices (like those found in the IATG) can significantly reduce such 
incidents’ ramifications.7 
One clear trend that defies easy analysis is the steep downturn in 
the number of UEMS recorded over the past five years (see Figure 
4). The rise of social media and global interconnectivity since the 
late 1990s might partly explain the relatively small number of re-
corded UEMS in the 1980s. If media and donor interest in this 
phenomenon has not diminished (and if the technology to report 
them has been constant), then the fall in the recorded number of 
incidents seems genuine. What explains this? More resources? 
Figure 2. The Survey’s PSSM Best Practice Cards.
Figure 3. (part of) the Survey’s UEMS IRT.
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Greater expertise? Better decision mak-
ing? A reduction in problematic stock-
piles due to the spate of explosions 
in the first decade or so of the 2000s? 
Transfers and consumption of large 
quantities of surplus ammunition to 
meet increased demand due to the grow-
ing number of armed conflicts? The 
Survey plans to address these policy- 
relevant questions by developing and im-
plementing a number of related projects in 
the coming years. Two illustrative exam-
ples include the LCMA Handbook and the 
Making Peace Operations More Effective 
(MPOME) Project.
The nine Southeast European countries 
participating in the Regional Approach 
to Stockpile Reduction (RASR) 
Initiative, which the Survey has been priv-
ileged to help support, have acknowledged 
that they possess surpluses and can improve 
on their current practices.8 Indeed, near-
ly 10 percent of the UEMS recorded since 
1979 in the Survey’s database have occurred 
in six of the nine RASR-participating states. 
The governments have sought to mitigate 
the risk of incidents by (among other things) 
destroying hundreds of thousands of tons of 
excess munitions. Some munitions destined 
for destruction have crossed state lines for 
destruction in neighboring states’ facilities, 
safely and in an environmentally acceptable 
manner. Experience shows, however, that 
progress toward reducing surplus is not a 
foregone conclusion and often occurs in fits 
and starts.9 Sales remain the favored mode 
of disposal for most governments, and re-
cent unplanned explosions in that region 
suggest that existing practices can still be 
improved and that the need to reduce sur-
plus remains a pressing challenge.
Governments in Southeast Europe and 
elsewhere often lack the financial resources 
to address the challenges posed by their ammunition and weapon 
stockpiles, and are often daunted by the legislative, logistical, and 
technical requirements. They often request international coopera-
tion to address these challenges. However, the rationale for and full 
extent of the sought-after assistance is often not well described, leav-
ing donors unwilling to support programs and initiatives that are 
not clearly explained and that do not lead to concrete outputs. To 
assist states to manage their stocks and reduce their surpluses safe-
ly, securely, and economically, the Survey in 2016 created a PSSM 
Priorities Matrix (see Figure 5). This tool helps states prioritize their 
stockpile management needs and articulate those needs to the donor 
community. Importantly, it moves states away from a wish list ap-
proach of asking donors for anything that might stick to a more con-
structive discourse. Similarly, the objective is to have donors reduce 
the likelihood for duplicating efforts.10
Overview of Ongoing and Upcoming Projects 
All of the previously-mentioned projects undertaken during the 
past five years remain important elements of the Survey’s ongoing 
work. The Survey is committed to developing its UEMS Database 
and utilizing its UEMS IRT more effectively. Resources permitting, 
the intention is to provide a 2nd Edition of the UEMS Handbook in 
2019. An edition of the popular PSSM Best Practice Cards with a 
LCMA focus is being developed, and the RASR effort will contin-
ue with new guidance from the latest RASR Workshop (held 3–4 
October in Podgorica, Montenegro). 
In light of the recent international shift in focus from immediate 
risk reduction toward a more comprehensive approach to weapons 
and ammunition management, the Survey has embarked on two 
initiatives that merit special mention: the LCMA Handbook and 
the MPOME Project.
The forthcoming LCMA Handbook is part of the Survey’s sus-
tained efforts toward highlighting the importance and challeng-
es of addressing ammunition fully across its life cycle, meaning 
cradle-to-grave. Geared to non-technical audiences (especially 
Figure 4. UEMS by Year, January 1979 to August 2017 (data for 2017 only covers eight months).
Figure 5. The Survey’s PSSM Priorities Matrix.
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decision makers and donors), the LCMA Handbook elaborates on 
the aspects required for the effective incorporation of the IATG 
at the national level. Indeed, one of the components of the hand-
book—a summary of the IATG’s more than 40 modules—will be 
made available as a stand-alone output and featured on the United 
Nation Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) website. As 
anticipated, the full study will be published in both English and 
French. As a first step, the Survey will work with MSAG, UNODA, 
and other partners, to make the IATG summary available in the 
four other official U.N. languages (Arabic, Chinese, Russian, and 
Spanish). The centerpiece of the Handbook consists of an LCMA 
Model that comprises four main elements: planning, procurement, 
management, and disposal (see Figure 6). The Handbook takes ad-
vantage of a case study on the experience of 
establishing an LCMA system in post-conflict 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and will incorpo-
rate examples of challenges and good practice 
from across the globe.  
The MPOME Project focuses on improving 
management practices of small arms and am-
munition within peace operations. Between 
2013 and 2015, the Survey developed its Peace 
Operations Data Set (PODS) that recorded 
attacks on peacekeepers in numerous mis-
sions in Sudan and South Sudan, and docu-
mented the loss of lethal material. In October 
2017, we released a study on attacks on peace-
keepers not limited to missions in those two 
countries, “Making a Tough Job more Difficult: Loss of Arms and 
Ammunition in Peace Operations” (see Figure 7).11 The report 
shows that the scale and scope of losses of contingent-owned equip-
ment (COE) in peace operations is greater than appreciated, and 
that improved practices could reduce the amount of materiel lost, 
and enhance a mission’s force protection posture and its ability to 
implement its mandate. The MPOME Project, which commenced in 
December 2016, builds on this work; it has four components. One 
concerns a series of regional workshops that will allow practitio-
ners in peace operations to share their experiences and, in so doing, 
chip away at the perceived taboo that such matters are too sensi-
tive to discuss. A second element involves working with actors un-
dertaking peace operations to develop countermeasures to better 
manage COE as well as recovered materiel in peace operations. For 
example, the Survey will work with the African 
Union to develop guidelines or standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for the latter. A third compo-
nent calls for the Survey to work bilaterally with 
states to learn how their peace operations training 
and oversight procedures have changed over the 
years to better manage COE and recovered materi-
el, and work with them to further improve on cur-
rent practice. Lastly, the MPOME Project provides 
for outreach efforts to explore additional partner-
ships and share the results of the various initiatives 
mentioned above. The initial phase of this project 
runs through March 2019.
Despite the significant progress that has been 
made in reducing the risk to safety and security 
posed by unsafe surplus materiel and in securing 
stockpiles, much more can be done. The potential 
policy and programming utilities of the UEMS 
Database and IRT remain underutilized. Other ex-
isting tools, such as the more recent PSSM Priorities Matrix and 
forthcoming resources, including the LCMA Handbook, will be 
more valuable with examples of challenges states and implementing 
bodies have encountered as well as of good practice. Many countries 
still view excess stockpiles as assets rather than liabilities, regard-
less of the conditions of their facilities and their ammunition or the 
questionable market for their wares. Moreover, many countries that 
would be willing to part with their excess and often aged materiel 
possess neither the know-how nor the resources to act appropriately 
(e.g., proper testing or improved storage). The Survey looks forward 
to continuing to work with states, practitioners, and donors at na-
tional, regional, and international levels to develop and promote 
tools and analyses to promote safe and secure storage and handling 
of ammunition, thereby reducing illicit proliferation of lethal mate-
rial and incidents of armed violence. 
See endnotes pag 66
Figure 6. The Survey’s LCMA Model.
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CROSSING THE FENCE: CHALLENGES 
OF OPERATIONALIZING PSSM 
by Elvan Isikozlu, Matthias Krötz, and Claire Trancart [ BICC ]
Physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) can be broadly defined as a series of activities that make nation-al stockpiles of weapons and ammunition safe and secure. 
Over the last decade, PSSM has become a highly requested form of 
intervention to curb the illicit flow of small arms and light weapons 
(SA/LW) and conventional ammunition (CA), as well as to keep 
communities safe from unintended explosions. Donors have pro-
vided substantial funding for PSSM activities to countries in sub-
Saharan Africa, where we have learned that the impact of PSSM 
assistance depends a great deal on how actively improvements are 
maintained.1  
Maintaining PSSM improvements has to do with influencing hu-
man behavior. Organizations supporting national institutions with 
PSSM are well aware of this but are often overwhelmed by immedi-
ate, tangible needs on the ground such as demands for new depots, 
fencing, or training. While these activities are critical, they will eas-
ily go to waste if PSSM is not practiced on a daily basis. This arti-
cle will discuss three challenges that we have observed and present 
some critical questions for organizations to consider when provid-
ing PSSM assistance.
Challenge #1: Leadership of PSSM
Traditionally, PSSM falls within the purview of defense and 
security institutions. However, since the Programme of Action to 
Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and 
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) was adopted in 2001, as well 
as the entry into force of, among others, the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention on Small Arms and 
Light Weapons (2006), States Parties are mandated to establish na-
tional SA/LW commissions to advise their governments, security, 
and defense forces in developing a small arms policy.2,3 PSSM is 
part of this policy and is therefore in the purview of national SA/
LW commissions. However, these commissions are often not rec-
ognized or treated as the legitimate leaders of PSSM, nor are they 
given adequate authority by the top echelons of government. This 
lack of clarity challenges the ability of implementing organizations 
to roll out their assistance, as they may have to coordinate with 
more than one national body in order to access storage facilities, 
interview personnel, and/or assist in setting priorities. 
Apart from which entity is the physical leader of the PSSM port-
folio, there is also the question of whether this entity provides 
conceptual leadership of PSSM. This has also been referred to as 
national ownership of the PSSM portfolio. In some cases, strong 
national leadership is overlooked by donors due to conflicting in-
terests. However, when national leadership of this kind is missing, 
it is often provided by outside organizations or donors who may 
implement their own priorities for PSSM. There are a number of 
reasons why national and local leadership of PSSM may be missing. 
For example, these leaders may prioritize other security-related 
issues over PSSM, and some may even benefit from the status quo. 
There are also practical reasons why national and local leadership 
of PSSM may be missing—namely a lack of motivation and capac-
ity to practice PSSM—to which we turn to next. 
Challenge #2: Motivation to Practice PSSM
Requesting assistance for PSSM does not necessarily mean that 
motivation to practice PSSM exists. Even if motivation for PSSM is 
high at the top level of government, it does not automatically trick-
le down. Motivation needs to exist at lower levels of government 
by those doing the job. It is not enough to train security service 
personnel and armorers on what they should do for PSSM, they 
should also be taught why. In most cases, this means understand-
ing some of their grievances and findings ways to relay them to na-
tional leaders of PSSM. For example, some individuals working in 
armories expressed frustration over the lack of career opportuni-
ties for PSSM personnel, especially given the potential health haz-
ards and physical danger of working around decaying weapons.4 
It is also important to consider whether there are motivations 
to not practice PSSM. Some individuals may benefit financially 
from having unregulated access to SA/LW by renting them out, 
selling them on the black market, supporting poaching activities, 
or committing robberies.5 Addressing motivations against PSSM 
is a significant challenge for implementers and, more importantly, 
for national governments. They can be mitigated through greater 
job recognition, career advancement opportunities, access to reg-
ular training, and salary increases. These qualitative and quan-
titative benefits can also serve as incentives to recruit and retain 
PSSM personnel. 
SA/LW records, smoke grenades, and coffee mugs are in a local armory. 
The image demonstrates the lack of standard operating procedures.
All photos courtesy of Nikhil Acharya, BICC.
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Challenge #3: Capacity to Practice PSSM
The lack of institutional capacity to practice PSSM—and the con-
sequent outsourcing of capacity to perform certain tasks—is an-
other challenge to maintaining PSSM improvements over the long 
term. Conflict-affected countries particularly struggle to take on 
the many responsibilities of PSSM. Tasks such as drafting standard 
operating procedures (SOP), organizing trainings, and coordinat-
ing armory inspections need to be assigned to a particular institu-
tion with the ability to absorb these tasks as part of their ongoing 
operations. In the absence of these institutions or skilled person-
nel, external or seconded staff is often invited to take over some 
of these tasks. The benefit of outsourcing is clear: improvements to 
PSSM are made in a relatively short period of time. The disadvan-
tage is that little of the expertise and skills necessary to operation-
alize PSSM are left behind. 
Dealing with this challenge means considering how any type of 
PSSM improvement will be operationalized before the work begins. 
It means assessing what kind of managerial capacities exist within 
responsible institutions and building these capacities in lieu of or in 
addition to material assistance. For example, PSSM requires skills 
in project management, budgeting, human resource management, 
etc., none of which are specific to PSSM per se but are critical to its 
practice over the long term. It also means adjusting the expecta-
tions of donors and implementers to match the realities of the local 
context and not the other way around. Many institutional capaci-
ties required to meet regional and international PSSM guidelines 
are limited. Rather than overburden these governments, it may be 
more realistic and effective to search for localized, low-cost options 
for stockpile safety and security that can be maintained and im-
proved upon in the future.
Looking Ahead
To date, PSSM assistance has understandably focused on ur-
gent needs and threats by providing material assistance, technical 
A Congolese armorer locks up his armory. The note on the door and the 
lock show cost-efficient measures to secure an armory.
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guidance, and equipment to sub-Saharan countries in particular. 
Our concern is that these needs and threats will reappear if assis-
tance does not address the less tangible, more human-oriented and 
longer-term needs for PSSM. The impact of PSSM comes from how 
actively any and all improvements are maintained. This means that 
PSSM needs to be practiced on a daily basis and integrated into the 
ongoing operations of designated institutions. It is time to reflect 
on the extent to which donors and implementing organizations are 
supporting these needs and hence the operationalization of PSSM. 
PSSM does not occur in a vacuum. The challenges that we have 
outlined in this article are also shared with the wider SA/LW and 
CA management agenda. It is difficult for any donor or external 
implementing agency to influence lasting change on this issue if a 
country does not have a national weapons control framework in 
which to legitimize and prioritize activities. There is only so much 
work that can be supported and sustained from the bottom up in 
the absence of top down directives and leadership. The best way 
forward for donors and implementing organizations is to support 
a combination of both, and to continue to reflect on the impact of 
their contributions. 
See endnotes page 66
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ACHIEVING PSSM THROUGH CIVIL 
SOCIETY AND MILITARY COOPERATION 
by Lee Moroney [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]
The core focus of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) is twofold: mitigate the risk of un-
planned explosions at munitions sites 
(UEMS) that could have drastic humani-
tarian consequences, and secure stockpiles 
from illicit diversion and munition theft 
that could fuel growing insurgencies, ter-
rorist events, and civil conflict by state and 
nonstate actors worldwide. These areas of 
concern increase the risks associated with 
national and regional stability. Increasing 
PSSM helps professionalize a state’s mili-
tary and security forces, which builds con-
fidence and strengthens security measures 
between security forces, the civilian popu-
lation, and its regional neighbors.
Previously a focus area of military-to-
military support, civil society—through 
donors, international nongovernmental or-
ganizations (INGO), and international or-
ganizations—have become more involved 
in directly assisting with states’ security forces in effective ammu-
nition stockpile management processes. Cooperation between civil 
society and the traditional owners of mine action (national mine 
action centers) has grown over the past two decades, yet civil soci-
ety’s support for a military role outside the five traditional pillars of 
humanitarian mine action (HMA) is still a challenge. Cambodia is 
no different in this respect, and Golden West has cooperated with 
the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) for two years now in 
PSSM best practice development. There continues to be support for 
mitigating Cambodia’s extensive landmine and unexploded ord-
nance (UXO) contamination, both by donors and organizations 
focused on clearance and land release; however, little focus was 
placed on the legacies associated with the ammunition that was 
stockpiled until 2007–2009 when a German organization, Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), conducted 
a project that addressed PSSM in Cambodia.
Program sustainability is necessary for PSSM programs to be 
successful. While Cambodia effectively had no ammunition stock-
pile or lifecycle-management practices in place, GIZ conducted 
training and introduced standard operating procedures (SOP). 
However, these practices were not followed once the program end-
ed. Since then, International Ammunition Technical Guidelines 
(IATG) were developed in 2011 to allow for a standardized struc-
tural approach to PSSM. There are many elements to consider when 
creating a sustainable program; however, long-term strategies of 
support are among the most proven. 
Typical storage conditions before reorganization within the Explosive Store House (ESH).
All photos courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.
Inspection of ammunition in the Ammunition Processing Area: A typi-
cal condition of a propellant charge degrading over time, which re-
sults in the ammunition being unserviceable and in need of disposal.
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Through the Explosive Harvesting Program (EHP) in Cambodia, 
Golden West provided charges via the Explosive Harvesting 
System (EHS) and was able to readdress this gap in capacity sup-
port, as Golden West was already known to the RCAF. It took time 
for the interlinked and complex activities of a full, PSSM capacity- 
development program to be accepted by the RCAF due to civil so-
ciety being engaged in what is traditionally and culturally seen as 
a sensitive area. When developing civil society-military relation-
ships, trust is built over time, something that must be understood 
by all stakeholders to secure a sustainable and solid PSSM program. 
While the EHP program began in 2005, Golden West’s role expand-
ed in 2015, with the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in 
the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 
(PM/WRA) as the donor, to consolidate already-identified, unser-
viceable, and surplus munitions from lesser secure storage areas into 
a Central Ammunition Depot (CAD). Munitions not appropriate for 
processing into charges for use by the HMA community were de-
stroyed as part of the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) dis-
posal operation that is integral to the EHP.
Through stockpile reduction, Golden West support evolved to in-
corporate the capacity development components of training, in ac-
cordance with the norms of international best practices. Refresher 
training on the basic principles of munition storage and transport 
was necessary, which allowed Golden West to identify the key per-
sonalities within the regional commands who would continue to be 
assisted in their technical development. 
In the author’s experience, this bottom-up approach is not always 
appropriate. However, this first-aid fix was the most appropriate 
The Ammunition Processing Area, constructed with funds from the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the U.S. Department of State’s 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), enables ammunition to be safely inspected in a controlled environment to enable RCAF to account for 
ammunition by its condition (serviceable or unserviceable). Golden West provided training to RCAF to allow for safe inspection and conditioning of 
its stockpiles.
start for the Golden West project in continuing to build trust while 
simultaneously assessing the requirements and implementing el-
ements of PSSM. This fluid strategy for project development con-
tinues to build trust and develop cooperation in what is normally 
viewed by militaries as a sensitive area, as previously mentioned.
It’s all About the Approach
The sensitivity issue is something that Golden West addressed 
from the start. Many within HMA are ex-military, and all partici-
pants recognized the right of a nation state to have the tools to de-
fend its sovereignty. This includes weapons and ammunition that 
militaries require to function as intended. Rather than pressuring 
countries into giving civil society access to ammunition depots so 
that civil society can identify unserviceable ammunition and poor 
stockpile management practices, the most efficient approach is to 
have countries enhance the capacity of their appropriate staff at all 
levels. This results in staff who can identify and account for both 
serviceable and unserviceable munitions, and allows for efficient 
stockpile destruction planning. This also facilitates the cycle of dis-
posal through efficient, munition lifecycle-management practices.
The obvious by-product of this approach is that the RCAF are 
able to empirically identify and accurately account for unservice-
able ammunition within military regions that they can then plan 
to incorporate into a disposal plan. In Cambodia, they continue to 
feed ammunition into the EHP and the country-wide HMA pro-
gram with ongoing donor support. 
Once up to a sustainable level, the RCAF will utilize its skill sets 
in order to properly manage its inspection and proofing cycles. 
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Basic items such as this locally designed and produced cage pallet help 
with safe movement of loose boxes of ammunition, where items such as 
banding equipment are not viable in low-income countries as a sustain-
able solution.
Members of the Cambodian PSSM team, composed of members from the 
Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, the Ministry of National Defense, and 
Golden West.
Ammunition will always age and become unserviceable. By 
ensuring adherence to lifecycle-management principles, they will be 
able to continue to reduce stockpiles of unserviceable ammunition 
and increase the safety of current, serviceable stockpiles.
Benefits take time to identify at the national level, and the con-
tinual support by donors for the long-term vision is important in 
supporting these principles. Civil society is well placed to provide 
momentum and contribute to this movement. Once support and as-
sistance is at an acceptable and achievable level—with the develop-
ment and adoption of doctrine, policies, strategy, procedures, and a 
sustainable training program and curriculum—the intent is then 
that this norm will be naturally adopted as an integral and essential 
part of the defense planning and budgeting. Full national owner-
ship and a more appropriate part of the national budget can then be 
allocated for adequate ammunition management practices. With 
time, patience, and focus, PSSM cooperation between civil society 
and militaries is achievable. 
RCAF officers conduct group work as part of the Golden West PSSM 
Training in Depot Management Planning for allocating units of space for 
the safe storage of ammunition in accordance with explosive limits with-
in their buildings and depots.
An RCAF technical officer undergoing testing on box marking identi-
fication. Correct and appropriate packaging and marking are integral 
to safe storage, identification, and accountability of ammunition. The 
availability of original or adequate packaging for ammunition and the 
appropriate basic markings continues to be challenging in countries with 
stockpiles of legacy ammunition left over from past conflicts.
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